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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The West African agricultural economy, like many economies in Sub-Sahara Africa, is part of a
global, complex, and increasingly integrated agricultural system. The interdependence between
domestic, regional and foreign agricultural production and trade policies now plays a central role
in the development of the agricultural sector in West Africa, and elsewhere in Africa. Since
January 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been the main international body that is
trying to structure and manage various interdependencies in the world trading system. This
report is a brief survey of WTO agreements and their implications for the West African
economies (including Chad). 
The study reviews the positions of West African countries on various WTO issues and compares
these positions with positions expressed by major trade partners, particularly the Cairns Group,
the European Union, Japan, Sub-Sahara Africa, and the United States. In total, 27 African
countries, including 8 from West Africa, are covered in the study, which also reviews all official
statements made by these countries at WTO fora between 1999 and 2002. The issues position
matrices (in Tables 4 and 5), which are the first ones put together for the West African region,
clearly reveal the similarity of concerns among the countries in the subregion. 
This report puts a special emphasis on the market access issues facing agriculture in the arena of
the international trade negotiations. It adopts a broad definition of the term "market access",
which not only includes the reduction in tariff barriers, but also (i) reductions in trade-distorting
domestic supports and export subsidies, (ii) a "fair" use of non-tariff barriers such as technical
regulations, and (iii) an effective implementation of WTO agreements regarding special and
differential treatments and technical assistance. The analysis reveals the following key points: 
• African countries' interest in the global trade has increased since the initiation of the
structural adjustment programs in early 1980s, which followed nearly two decades of
inward-looking development policies after independence. However, the anticipated
benefits from an open trade regime have been slow to materialize.  It is with a general
feeling of frustration and powerlessness that most countries in Africa, including those in
West Africa, now perceive that the six-year implementation of WTO agreements has
generally not delivered on their promises. In their various statements to WTO summits,
West African countries have deplored the nonfulfillment of commitments to allow greater
access to OECD and third-country markets by reducing tariffs, domestic supports, and
export subsidies. The West African countries have also seriously condemned what they
perceive as the insufficient provision of trade-related technical assistance and the neglect
of the special and differential treatment provisions of the WTO agreements. 
• WTO agreements call for a reduction in tariff rates and the conversion of non-tariff
barriers, such as quotas, into tariffs. Developed countries have higher reduction
commitments than the developing countries (36% versus 24%), while the least-developed
countries (LDCs) are exempted from these commitments. All the West African countries
except Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria are considered as LDCs.  The extent to whichv
these agreements were implemented is still not well understood, but many African
countries have deplored the widespread use of tariff peaks (selectively high tariff rates)
and tariff escalations (higher tariffs on processed products) by Northern countries over
the past six years. The implementation of tariff reductions may also be done in
conjunction with contingency measures, such as the agreements on anti-dumping,
countervailing duties, and special safeguards. Countries may resort to these measures to
temporarily increase their tariff levels in order to protect a domestic industry against
injury caused by imports. However, West African countries have expressed fears about
the potential abuse of these measures for protection purposes. 
• The agreements also require reductions in domestic supports and export subsidies, with
greater reductions required for high-income countries than for the developing and the
least-developed countries. Export subsidies tend to be more transparent and easier to
track than domestic support policies. Over the past six years, there has been a slight
reduction in export subsidies, but not in domestic supports, which were rather increased
through the mechanism of "reinstrumentation" -- the repackaging of the support measures
from prohibited to authorized policy instruments. The elimination or reduction in the
levels of domestic supports and export subsidy policies will probably increase
agricultural prices, which may potentially drive up export earnings and food import bills
in most African countries. The final impact on food security is ambiguous, depending on
whether the price effect outweighs the income effect.  The food security issue is, in fact,
one of the numerous noncommodity issues that some countries, led by EU and Japan, are
pushing the WTO to give greater weight to, under the concept of "multifunctionality." 
• Other WTO agreements of interest to Africa include the agreements on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs).  Designed to
facilitate global trade in agricultural products, these agreements may also be potentially
used as disguised forms of protection, a situation severely condemned by most African
countries. African countries have also pointed out that technical regulations in developed
countries are increasingly demanding. There is, however, a demand-driven component of
higher technical requirements in the North, which leaves little room for renegotiation at
WTO.  On their side, developed countries have expressed the desire to see a change in
the often-difficult custom procedures that characterize most economies in the South. 
• In order to meet technical requirements and other commitments made under the WTO
agreements and to mitigate the negative impacts of the global trade reform on the
developing and the least-developed economies, the WTO members agreed that the these
countries would benefit from technical assistance and special and differential treatments.
Despite the involvement of many multilateral and bilateral bodies in the provision of
WTO-related technical assistance to most African countries over the past years, the
demand for assistance is still enormous. Without such assistance and increased market
access opportunities for these countries, it is likely that most of them will increasingly
find themselves on the periphery of the global commercial tide. vi
• However, liberalization of the world agricultural markets is not a short-term task. 
African countries should not to count on any sizeable increase of their share in the global
agricultural trade in a near future. This discouraging reality should not, however, prevent
the region from intensifying its targeted trade liberalization efforts, especially in relation
to intraregional trade. African economies will continue to be substantially dependent on
international trade, and they will certainly be better off by closely watching and
participating in the making of the WTO process.  vii
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ACP-EU (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific – European Union) Agreements
See Lomé and Cotonou Agreements
Ad valorem tariff 
A fixed percentage charge levied on the value of imports.  
African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA)
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
Part of the Uruguay Round agreement covering agriculture-related issues, such as market access, export
subsidies, and domestic support. 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) 
An index that measures the monetary value of the extent of government support to a sector. The AMS, as
defined in the Agreement on Agriculture, includes both budgetary outlays as well as revenue transfers from




Additional duties imposed on exporters that sell at unfairly low prices, if proof of actual or potential material
injury to the importing country is established.
Autarky




Bound tariff rates 
Maximum tariff rates that a given WTO member country agrees to charge on imports. Bound tariff rates are
enforceable under WTO agreements and may be subject to retaliatory actions if a given WTO member raises
a tariff above the bound rate. 
Cairns Group
A group formed by eighteen agricultural exporting countries in 1986 in Cairns, Australia, that seeks the
removal of trade barriers and substantial reductions in subsidies affecting agricultural trade. The eighteen
member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji,
Guatemala, Indonesian, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and
Uruguay. 
Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS)
A permanent committee of nine Sahelian States endeavoring to control drought, ensure food security, and
promote efficient management of natural resources in the region. Member countries are Burkina Faso, Capex
Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad. The English name for CILSS is
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel.
Common External Tariff (CET)
Common tariff charged by a regional group on extra-regional imports. The group may apply lower tariffs or
no tariff on intra-regional exchange. 
Conformity assessment procedures
The part of the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). The aim of these procedures is to assess
whether a traded good complies with technical standards. These procedures must not discriminate between
domestic and foreign firms.
Cotonou Agreement
See Lomé and Cotonou Agreements
Countervailing Duty (CD)
A supplementary levy imposed on imported goods to counteract subsidies provided to producers or exporters
by the government of the exporting country. 
De minimis rule  
The total AMS (defined above) does not include any specific commodity support that is less than 5% of its
production value, neither does it include any noncommodity-specific support level lower than 5% of the
value of total agricultural output. 
Developed Countries (DCs)
All developed countries in Western European, Northern American, and Asian Pacific regions.
Developing Countries
Usually middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Dispute Settlement
The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade disputes between member countries. A dispute arises when a
member government believes another member government is violating an agreement or a commitment that it
has made in the WTO (www.wto.org). 
Domestic Supports
Policies that provide price support or other forms of subsidies to agricultural productions. The Agreement on
Agriculture defines three different types of domestic supports: green box, blue box and amber box policies.
The amber box contains all domestic support measures that are subject to reduction commitments under the
AgreCement on Agriculture. The blue box refers to policies that are considered to have a minimum effect on
trade and the green box regroups policies that are considered to have no or little impacts on trade. Both the
green box and blue box support policies are not subject to reduction commitment. 
European Community (EC)
European Union (EU)
A common market of fifteen European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy,
France, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. 
Export credits or guarantee (or insurance)
A government-guaranteed credit for commercial financing of agricultural exports; often to protect its
exporters against loss due to nonpayment by foreign buyers.xi
Export subsidy 
A government payment made to an exporter for facilitating exports. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Free trade 
A state of drastic reduction or elimination of tariffs and quotas on some or all goods between countries. Free
trade does not preclude each country to pursue independent policies with respect to the rest of the world. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
An agreement dating from 1947 to increase international trade by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers.
The agreement is now fully integrated to WTO. 
Green box
See Domestic Supports.
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
Generally poor countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Lomé and Cotonou Agreements
Preferential trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries. The Cotonou Agreement, signed on 23 June 2000, replaced the defunct Lomé IV agreement
signed in December 1989. Before Lomé IV, were Lomé I (February 1975) and Lomé III (December 1984).
There are currently 77 member countries in ACP groups. These are: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo,
Congo Democratic Republic, Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,
The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Equatorial, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya,
Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia
(Federated States Of), Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Dominican Republic, Central African Republic, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, St Kitts And Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent And The
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu,
Uganda, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Marrakech Decision
The final act of the Uruguay Agreement concluded in Marrakech, Morocco, in April 1994.
Market access
The extent to which foreign products can enter a domestic market. Importing countries may resort to a variety
of tariff and nontariff trade barriers to limit market access to foreign products.
Multi functionality
Often refers to the different roles agriculture plays in a given country’s economy. These roles include, but not
limited to, ensuring food security, protecting the environment, managing structural adjustment programs,
supporting rural development, and alleviating poverty.
Non Governmental Organization (NGO)
Non Tariff Barrier (NTB)
Governmental restrictions on imports from, and exports to, other countries. These restrictions include
embargoes, import quotas, and technical barriers to trade.xii
Notifications (Notify)
The process by which member countries report annually to the WTO information on commitments, changes
in policies, and other related matters as required by the various agreements.  
Open trade regime
Policies that encourage free trade (see above).
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Protectionism (Protectionist Policies)
The practice of shielding domestic industry production by using tariffs and quotas to discourage imports. 
Regionalism
The creation of a common economic or commercial space between countries, which adopt a mutually
advantageous trade rules among themselves, as compared with the rest of the world. 
Rules of origin
The criteria used to determine where a product is made. The rules of origin are necessary to implement a
wide range of trade policies such as quotas, antidumping, countervailing duties, preferential tariffs, and so on.
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
An agreement on food safety and animal and plant health standards for agricultural products that are traded
globally.
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)
The provision that allows exports from developing countries to receive preferential access to markets in
developed countries on a nonreciprocal basis.
Special Safeguards (SS)
Are similar countervailing duties (see above). Their application is restricted to situations where imported
products cause "serious injury" to a domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. 
State Trading Enterprises (STE) 
An enterprise authorized to engage in trade that is owned, sanctioned, or otherwise supported by the
government. Many STEs enjoy monopoly control over imports or exports.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
Macroeconomic policies reforms initiated since the early 1980s by the Breton Woods institutions in
conjunction with developing countries, particularly in Africa, with in the aim to correct severe imbalances in
these economies.
Tariff 
A tax imposed by a nation on an imported good or service. 
Tariff escalation
Increases in the tariffs in response to the level of processing: the more a product is processed, the higher the
rate of tariff applied. 
Tariff peak
Very high tariffs usually applied on out-of-quota imports. See Tariff-rate quota (TRQ). 
Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ)
A rate restriction involving a lower (in quota) tariff rate for a specified volume of imports and a higher (out-
of-quota) tariff rate for imports above the conceded access level. xiii
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Technical requirements, such as products or process standards, set at levels excessively limiting or even
prohibiting trade.
Trade facilitation
The simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures. 
Trade procedures
Activities, practices, and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating, and processing data
required for the movement of goods in international trade.
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
A WTO agreement that regulates trade-related foreign investment. For example, the TRIMs Agreement
prohibits measures such as local content requirements, which are inconsistent with basic principles of WTO. 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
A WTO agreement designed to narrow the gap between countries regarding the way property rights are
protected and enforced. TRIPs cover different aspects of property rights, including copyright and related
rights, as well as trademarks such as service marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, and
layout-designs of integrated circuits. They also regulate undisclosed information, such as trade secrets. 
United Nation Conference on Trade, Agriculture, and Development (UNCTAD)
Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement 
A trade agreement designed to open world markets. The Agreement on Agriculture is one of the 29
individual legal texts included in the final act under an umbrella agreement establishing the WTO. The
negotiation began at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 and concluded in Marrakech, Morocco in
April 1994.  
Value Added 
The difference between the cost of materials purchased by a firm and the price for which it sells goods
produced using those materials. This difference represents the value added by the productive activities of the
firm.
Value Added Tax (VAT)
Tax on the value added. See value added above. 
West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
An economic and monetary formed by eight West African countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The Union implements a common monetary policy
and applies a common external tariff on extra-regional imports. The ultimate goal of the Union is the perfect
integration between the economies of the region, and several criteria are routinely used to measure the degree
of convergence between these economies. 
World Trade Organization (WTO)
A multilateral organization established on January 1, 1995, with the aim to promote a rule-based
liberalization and functioning of the multilateral trading system. WTO replaced GATT following eight years
of Uruguay Round of negotiations. There are currently 143 countries that are members of WTO.1
1.  INTRODUCTION
The 21
st century is characterized by the process of increased integration between economies. The
markets for goods, services, and capital in a country depend not only on domestic conditions but
also on market and political forces originating in other countries. In West Africa, where
agriculture remains the backbone of the economy, the interdependence between domestic and
foreign trade and production policies plays a central role in the development of this key sector.
Paddy production in Senegal, for example, may be influenced by rice imports from Vietnam;
dairy production in Côte d’Ivoire may be hampered by cheap milk imports from the European
Union (EU); exports of fruits and vegetables from Mali or Burkina Faso may be increased by
preferential market access to EU markets; domestic cotton policies in the United States (U.S.)
may affect cotton production in West African countries, and so forth. The impact of each of
these trade relationships on different parties involved is often ambiguous, hence the need for an
international body aimed at structuring the various interdependencies in the world trading
system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has played this role since January 1995.
This report is a brief overview on the implications of the WTO agreements for the agricultural
sector in West Africa and Chad. Fifteen out of the seventeen countries that constitute the group
are members of WTO. Most of these countries were also contracting parties in the General
Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the early years following their independence in the
1960s (Table 1).
Table 1.  When Did West African Countries Become Gatt’s Contracting Parties and WTO
Members?
Countries GATT WTO 
Benin* 12 September 1963 22 February 1996
Burkina Faso* 3 May 1963 3 June 1995
Cape Verde* Was not a contracting party Observer—in process of admission
Chad* 12 July 1963 19 October 1996
Côte d’Ivoire 31 December 1963 1 January 1995
Gambia, The* 22 February 1965 23 October 1996
Ghana 17 October 1957 1 January 1995
Guinea * 8 December 1994 25 October 1995
Guinea Bissau* 17 March 1994 31 May 1995
Liberia Was not a contracting party Nonmember and not observer
Mali* 11 January 1993 31 May 1995
Mauritania* 30 September 1963 31 May 1995
Niger* 31 December 1963 13 December 1996
Nigeria 18 November 1960 1 January 1995
Senegal* 27 September 1963 1 January 1995
Sierra Leone* 19 May 1961 23 July 1995
Togo* 20 March 1964 1 May 1995
* The least-developed countries2 The protest was held in Seattle, United States, in November 1999 during the Third WTO Ministerial Conference.
Many WTO members described the Conference as a failure, thus giving more importance to NGOs’ arguments. 
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Anticipating the benefits of an open trade regime (as opposed to autarky), West African
countries and other developing countries have generally been eager to share the GATT and WTO
freer-trade philosophy, especially after the inception of the structural adjustment programs,
which dismantled some of the protectionist trade policies in place in these countries before the
early 1980s. The enthusiasm, however, is being increasingly eroded and displaced by a feeling of
frustration and powerlessness, as these countries realize that the letter and spirit of the
agreements are not fully implemented. In their various statements to WTO summits, West
African countries have deplored the nonfulfillment of commitments on market access in terms of
reductions in tariffs, domestic supports and export subsidies. The non- or insufficient provision
of trade-related technical assistance and the neglect of the special and differential treatments
have also been seriously condemned. In short, the least developed countries, including those of
West Africa, feel that they have been marginalized in the six-year implementation of WTO
agreements. 
The critique of marginalization is often relayed and amplified by many nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), which are leading a massive campaign against the WTO attempts to
achieve a greater rule-based liberalization of the world trade. NGOs efforts culminated in the
vast Seattle 1999 protest against what is perceived as corporate domination of the global trade.
2
This domination, some NGOs charge, has had negative impacts on the environment and the
living standards of rural communities in the South. The present report does not delve into the
WTO-NGOs controversial views on the contribution of the multilateral trading system to the
agriculture-based global welfare. It rather surveys the agreements on agriculture from the
perspectives of countries and groups of countries. The report is mainly based on statements made
by various countries at the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999. Additional
materials covered in the report include several negotiating proposals submitted by countries and
groups of countries following the Seattle meeting, as well as more recent statements at the
Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.  
This report emphasizes the market access issues facing agriculture in the arena of the
international trade negotiations. The study covers 27 African countries (including 8 from West
Africa), the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the Cairns Group (Table 2). This
initial analysis excludes countries from Asia, Latin and Central America, as well as the
economies in transition from Eastern Europe. Subsequent investigations will pay more attention
to these three regions, which present increasingly strategic exchange interest for West Africa.
The Cairns Group is included in this initial phase of the study because of its weight in
multilateral negotiations on agriculture, where African countries have their most vital interests. 3
Table 2. Countries Coverage and Base Documents for the WTO Position Matrices in




West Africa and Chad 3
rd WTO Ministerial Conference: Statements made by Ministers from Burkina Faso,
Côte-d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia
Rest of Africa 3
rd WTO Ministerial Conference: Statements by Ministers Morocco, Tanzania, South
Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, Botswana, Lesotho, Angola, Uganda, Algeria, Gabon,
Zimbabwe, Egypt, Kenya, Zambia, Burundi, Sudan, Malawi, Cameroon
United States Docs WT/MIN(99)/ST/12; G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000; G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June
2000; G/AG/NG/W/32, 12 July 2000 
European Union Docs WT/MIN(99)/ST/3; WT/MIN(99)/ST/4; G/AG/NG/W/34, 18 September 2000;
G/AG/NG/W/18, 28 June 2000; G/AG/NG/W/17, 28 June 2000
Japan  Docs WT/MIN(99)/ST/26; WT/MIN(99)/ST/44; G/AG/NG/W/46, 5 October 2000
The Cairn Group Docs G/AG/NG/W/11, 16 June 2000; G/AG/NG/W/21, 11 July 2000; G/AG/NG/W/40,
5 October 2000 
This report adopts a definition of the term “market access” that is broader than is typically used
in the literature. Traditionally “market access” refers to a reduction in tariff barriers. Market
access is understood here to include all types of measures aimed at strengthening the
opportunities of entry of a commodity into a foreign market. From the perspective of West
African economies, besides tariff cuts, these measures involve:
• reductions in trade-distorting domestic supports and export subsidies in developed
countries;
• a fair use of nontariff barriers such as technical regulations; and
• an effective implementation of WTO agreements regarding special and differential
treatments and technical assistance, etc. 
The remaining part of the report presents a brief historical overview of GATT and WTO, and
then discusses each of the components of market access as perceived by the major countries and
groups of countries. The study also identifies some key areas of further investigation regarding
the implications of the WTO agreements on West African agriculture.  3 This section heavily draws on information available on the WTO web site, www.wto.org.
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2.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON GATT AND THE WTO MANDATE
3
GATT was both a provisional agreement and an organization that oversaw the multilateral
trading system for almost half a century (1947-1994). There were 128 countries—including the
14 West African countries and Chad—that had signed GATT by the end of 1994. The
organization helped to reduce tariffs at an earlier stage of world trade liberalization, resulting in
high rates of world trade growth (8% on the average) in the 1950s and 1960s. However,
following economic recession in the 1970s and early 1980s, developed countries in Europe and
North America reinforced their protectionist policies (e.g., increase in agricultural subsidies),
which seriously damaged the credibility and effectiveness of the organization. Also, GATT
agreements, which were developed to structure the multilateral trading system in the late 1940s,
became inadequate to address more complex and diversified trade issues of the 1980s. Thus, it
became necessary to strengthen and broaden the system. This was done over nearly 8 years of
negotiations at the Uruguay Rounds, resulting in the creation of WTO in January 1995. GATT-
organization was dissolved, and GATT-agreement was amended, extended and integrated to
WTO.
The WTO Secretariat in Geneva has highlighted five key differences between WTO and GATT:  
   
• GATT was ad hoc and provisional. It was never ratified in members’ parliaments, and
it contained no provisions for the creation of an organization;
• The WTO and its agreements are permanent. The WTO is an international
organization with a sound legal basis.  Members have ratified the WTO agreements
and the agreements themselves describe how the WTO is to function;
• The WTO has “members” while GATT had “contracting parties,” underscoring the
fact that officially GATT was a legal text;
• GATT dealt with trade in goods, whereas WTO covers services and intellectual
property as well; and
• The WTO dispute settlement system is faster and more automatic than the old GATT
system. The WTO’s rulings cannot be blocked.
The WTO counted 143 members by the end of the year 2001, with China being the 143
rd
member. The organization is the only one that deals with international trade rules between
countries. The WTO activities are based on rules, which are the outcome of negotiations among
members. It is not currently possible to indicate whether the organizational differences between
GATT and WTO have resulted in noticeable changes or not in the functioning of the world trade,
especially vis-à-vis of West African countries. Neither is it possible to tell how these differences
will affect the performance in the future. WTO, obviously, has a much broader scope than 5
GATT, but the current and future performance as well as the credibility of the organization will
be undermined if current agreements remain poorly implemented. 
The organization indeed has multiple objectives, as outlined in the Preamble of the Marrakech
Decision establishing WTO. Some of these objectives include:  raising the living standards of
people around the world; ensuring full employment as well as steady growth in real income and
effective demand; and expanding the production and trade of goods and services in an efficient
and sustainable way through the respect of specific development needs of each member country.
The Preamble of the agreements also recognizes the need for countries to devote special efforts
in order to ensure that developing countries, and particularly the least developed countries, have
a fair share in the growth in global trade. It emphasizes the importance of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements aimed at reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade while eliminating
discriminatory practices in international trade relations.
The WTO’s main function is to administer the agreements by:
• organizing forums for trade negotiations; 
• handling trade disputes;
• monitoring national trade policies;
• providing technical assistance and training for developing countries; and 
• cooperating with other international organizations. 
The administration of WTO follows some key principles while exercising these functions. These
include the need to: 
• treat all trading partners equally without discriminating between them;
• work for freer trade between nations; 
• make the multilateral trading system predictable and prevent the use of arbitrary tariffs
or nontariffs protection measures; 
• encourage competitive trade policies that do not rely, for example, on dumping as
means of increasing market share; and 
• make the system advantageous to the least-developed countries. 
Some of these principles, nondiscrimination in particular, are violated by the existence of
regionalism (WAEMU, ECOWAS) or preferential trade arrangements (Lomé and Cotonou
Agreements). There are, however, other special provisions in the WTO Agreements, which allow
the West African countries to form regional commercial blocks and benefit from trading6
preferences extended to them by the European Union. For example, the Doha 2001 WTO
ministerial conference exempted the ACP-EU Agreement from the nondiscriminatory
requirements. Future publications will treat in more detail the issues of intra and extra-regional
preferential trade arrangements in West Africa. As mentioned earlier, this report focuses
primarily on the issues of tariff barriers, export subsidies, and domestic supports.7
3.  TARIFF BARRIERS
The aim of WTO negotiations on tariff barriers is twofold: eliminate or reduce tariff rates and
convert nontariff barriers, such as trade quotas, into tariffs. The conversion of quotas into tariffs
is referred to as tariffication. Tariff instruments may also be used in connection to other
agreements, such as the agreements on antidumping (AD), countervailing duties (CDs), and
special safeguards (SS). These three agreements may be viewed as contingency measures
allowing beneficiary countries to increase temporarily their tariff levels in order to protect a
domestic industry against injury caused by imports. (See section 3.3 for more details on these
three measures.) 
The Uruguay Round agreements on agriculture spell out several rules for a progressive reduction
in tariff rates, conversion of nontariff barriers into tariffs (tariffication), and the use of
contingency measures. In accordance with the WTO principle of favorable treatment of the least
developed countries, the agreements generally require higher commitments and shorter
implementation periods in developed countries compared to developing countries (Table 3). The
least-developed countries are exempted from most tariff reductions. Besides Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, and Nigeria, which are considered as developing countries, all the remaining West
African countries have the status of least-developed countries at WTO. 
Table 3. Overview of Commitments on Tariff Barriers from the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture











Convert all nontariff barriers to
tariffs
Reduce tariffs by 36% Overall
within 6 years
Minimum 15% per tariff line
“Tariffy” all quotas; Increase the
in-quota volume by at least 3% (to
be increased to 5%) of the
consumption needs
Importers may use additional
tariffs on tariff-rate quota
commodities, if subsidized
imports constitute serious threats
to the domestic industry; the
WTO Agreement defines the
modalities of use of special
safeguards
Same as DCs
Reduce tariffs by 24%
Overall within 10 years;





Exempt from reductions, but
must at least bind tariffs
Same as DCs
Same as DCs
Adapted from Regmi, Trueblood, and Shapouri 20004 Bound tariff levels are the maximum rates countries agree to charge on a given commodity.
5 Tariff peaks are the excessively high tariff rates charged on exports once the allocated quota is filled. Tariff
escalation is the practice that consists of charging higher tariff rates as the level of processing of a commodity
increases. 
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3.1.  Tariff Reductions
Reductions in tariff rates are evaluated with respect to a base level. The base tariff level is
determined in two ways: either by the bound tariff levels
4 (if tariffs are bound before January 1,
1995) or by the actual rates charged at the beginning of Uruguay Round in September 1986. As
indicated in Table 3, developed countries agree to schedule reductions in their out-of-quota
tariffs by an average of 36%, equally distributed over six years, beginning January 1, 1995.
Developing countries were expected to implement a 24% reduction over a period of 10 years.
Minimum cuts per product were 15% and 10% for developed and developing countries,
respectively. The least developed countries were exempted from such reduction schedules, as
mentioned earlier. It is extremely difficult to know the extent to which developed countries
complied with these commitments at the end of the six-year implementation period. WTO (2001)
argues that bound tariffs fairly approximate the tariff rates that developed countries apply to
agricultural imports. The approximation is not straightforward for the developing and the least-
developed countries, as there is usually a huge discrepancy between bound and applied rates. For
example, Mali applied on the average 28.7% on agricultural imports in 1997 and bounded the
tariff rate at an average of 60%. This rate jumped to an average of 110% in 2000 (Table 6).
Australia, Japan, and U.S. charged an average tariff of 1.2%, 26.3%, and 10.7%, respectively on
agricultural imports in 1998-1999; their average bound tariff rates are 3.3%, 25.3%, and 8.2%,
respectively (WTO 2001).  
                  
Though most West African countries are classified as least developed countries and, thereby,
exempted from reduction commitments, there have been unilateral efforts to cut tariffs under the
structural adjustment programs in many countries. Besides, member countries of the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) also engaged in extensive structural reforms,
resulting in the harmonization and simplification of import taxation policy within the Union (see
Box 1 in the Appendices for details on fiscal and commercial policies in WAEMU). 
Country comparative analyses in Tables 4 and 5 show that there is a general consensus among
countries to reduce substantially or even eliminate tariffs on products originating in the least
developed countries. This consensus clearly emerged since Seattle 1999 and was restated with
Doha 2001. Sub-Sahara African countries are unanimous about the need to reduce tariff peaks
and eliminate tariff escalation.
5 This position is also strongly supported by the United States and
the Cairns Group. Japan proposed a more comprehensive market access system that would cover
agriculture, services, and industrial tariffs. The European Union, while inviting the developed
countries to offer duty-free access to exports originating in the least developed countries,
remains the least favorable to the idea of an unconditional elimination of tariff peaks, tariff
escalation, and other contingent protection measures such as antidumping, countervailing duties,
and special safeguards.9
AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support—DC’s = Developed Countries—LDCs = Least-Developed Countries—NTB/TBT = Non Tariff Barriers/Technical Barriers to
Trade—SDT = Special and Differential Treatment—SPS = Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards—STE = State Trading Enterprises—SS = Special Safeguards—TRIMs =
Trade-Related Investment Measures—TRIPs = Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights—TRQ = Tariff-Rate Quota
Table 4. Matrix of Policy Issues Positions of West African Countries
Countries Tariff Barriers Domestic Support Export
Competition
Nontariff Barriers









Burkina Faso Totally free market access  to















and TBTs as part of
SDTs
Cote d’Ivoire No use of arbitrary  measures,
such as tariff peak and
countervailing duties, that
reduce market access














Gambia Give unfettered duty-free
market access to products from









Mali Duty-free access to fruits and
vegetables, livestock products
(red meat, cattle, hides and
leather), cotton from LDCs
Substantial reduction of
domestic support in DCs;
Maintain the right of cotton
State Trading Enterprises
















Assist LDCs to build
their capacity and
expertise in trade
policy and help them
meet their
commitments








Help build human and
institutional capacity
and improve trade
infrastructureCountries Tariff Barriers Domestic Support Export
Competition
Nontariff Barriers










AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support—DCs = Developed Countries—LDCs = Least-Developed Countries—NTB/TBT = Non Tariff Barriers/Technical
Barriers to Trade—SDT = Special and Differential Treatment—SPS = Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards—STE = State Trading Enterprises—SS = Special
Safeguards—TRIMs = Trade-Related Investment Measures—TRIPs = Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights—TRQ = Tariff-Rate Quota
Nigeria Remove tariff escalation and put
a ceiling to tariff peaks in DCs;
expand tariff quotas and lower
in-quotas tariffs; Recognize that
LDCs need flexibility while




Allow LDCs to take new
support measures up to levels
substantially higher than the
“de minimis” levels; remove
limitations imposed on
countries that have not
scheduled
 reductions in their domestic
support; increase flexibility
of LDCs to use domestic
supports to improve food











































Senegal LDCs’ exports have
encountered tariff barriers, such
as tariff peak and tariff
escalation in DCs and these
need to be removed; grant total
exemption from duties and
quotas to LDCs
Allow LDCs the flexibility to
give internal support to the
agricultural sector in order to
ensure food security,



































Sierra Leone Tariff peaks and tariff escalation
negatively affects products in
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capacityCountries Tariff Barriers Domestic Support Export
Competition
Nontariff Barriers










AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support—DCs = Developed Countries—LDCs = Least-Developed Countries—NTB/TBT = Non Tariff Barriers/Technical
Barriers to Trade—SDT = Special and Differential Treatment—SPS = Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards—STE = State Trading Enterprises—SS = Special
Safeguards—TRIMs = Trade-Related Investment Measures—TRIPs = Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights—TRQ = Tariff-Rate Quota
African
Group*
Give credit to Africa for its
autonomous agricultural
liberalization; further domestic
tariff reductions must be linked
to substantial cuts in domestic
supports and export subsidies in
DCs, which must also reduce
tariff peak and escalation and
offer tariff-free and quota-free
access to exports from LDCs;
make tariff rate quotas (TRQs)
available to small farmers and
traders; maintain current tariff
bounds.
Reduce substantially and
progressively all trade- and
production-distorting
domestic support measures in
DCs; tighten the range of use
of the “green box” policies
so as to make them
minimally distorting; make
the “de minimis” provision
more flexible for LDCs,
allow LDCs to provide AMS
supports under development
programs; input and
investment subsidies to poor






















































Duty-free market access to
products originating in LDCs;
eliminate tariff peak, tariff
escalation, and countervailing
duties or avoid their arbitrary
use; condition further reduction
to substantial reductions in all
distorting policies in DCs
Abolish subsidies to
agriculture in DCs; reform




development needs of LDCs
and help address poverty




over time; find a
definitive solution





















SPS and TBTs as


























* The Africa Group, which is composed by 41 African countries, has submitted a joint negotiating proposal on March 23, 2001.  West African countries that authored that proposal are, beside the
eight countries that appear in the present table, Benin, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger and Togo.  It was not possible to find ay record on position statements by Liberia and Cape Verde,
which also belong to the West African Region.12
Table 5. Matrix of Policy Issues Positions of WTO Negotiating Partners
Region/
Countries













Duty-free market access to
products originating in
LDCs; eliminate tariff
peak, tariff escalation, and
countervailing duties or
avoid their arbitrary use;
condition further
reductions to substantial
reductions in all distorting
policies in DCs
Abolish subsidies to
agriculture in DCs; reform
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Rest of Africa Same as West Africa Same as West Africa
In addition, reduce domestic
support in the DCs,
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categories of domestic
















































European Union DCs should offer duty-free
market access to the least
developed countries;
overall average reduction








Domestic support will be
reduced or abolish on
condition that beneficiaries
are compensated by other
means; maintain the
concepts of “blue” and
“green” boxes; further
reduction in AMS starting
from the final bound
commitment levels; revisit
criteria for categorizing








































assistance to help build
capacity in LDCs
Japan Intend to extend tariff-free
treatment to essentially all
products originating in






and must be based on the
need for multifunctionality





A certain realistic level of
domestic support is
indispensable, and this
should be based on climatic
conditions and the state of
agricultural policy reform in
each country; maintain both
green and blue boxes to
address food security and
agricultural
multifunctionality issues;
total AMS should be
determined in a realistic
manner, using the ceiling a

















































The Cairns Group Place trade in agricultural
goods on the same basis as
trade in other goods; deep
cuts to all tariffs, including
tariff peak and escalation;











SDTs must not be
compromisedRegion/
Countries











AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support—DCs = Developed Countries—LDCs = Least-Developed Countries—NTB/TBT = Non Tariff Barriers/Technical
Barriers to Trade—SDT = Special and Differential Treatment—SPS = Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards—STE = State Trading Enterprises—SS = Special
Safeguards—TRIMs = Trade-Related Investment Measures—TRIPs = Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights—TRQ = Tariff-Rate Quota
Consensus and
differences
Overall consensus on the
need to reduce or even
eliminate tariffs on
products originating in the
LDCs; African countries
and the  Cairns Group are
in favor of the elimination
of tariff peak, tariff
escalation and
countervailing duties, but
the other partners are less




access, while EU proposes
conditional access with due
consideration to
geographical indications;




Africa, the Cairns Group and




elimination takes place not
only in agriculture but also
in inefficient industries and
sectors in DCs. Both EU and
Japan want to maintain the
green and blue boxes but
support reforms in the
policies classified under
these boxes; they further
expect reductions in total
AMS but these must start
from the final bounds; Japan
wants to link domestic
support to multifunctionality
and food security, a position





















propose not to abuse
food aid
Africa demands that




not be used as
disguised protection;
Africa and Japan want
a review of the
agreements on TBTs
and other NTBs,








regards to tariffs as



































All agree on the need to
provide some technical
assistance to LDCs in
order to help them meet
their commitments,




expect the assistance to
help strengthen their
competitiveness.6 See WTO document G/AG/NG/W/37 (September 28, 2000)—Statement on market access submitted by Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Salvador, Honduras, Kenya, India, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
7 See WTO document G/AG/NG/W/60 (29 November 2000)—Statement by Australia on behalf of the Cairns
Group at the Fourth Special Session Of The Committee On Agriculture, 15-17 November 2000. The UNCTAD’s
research may be found in UNCTAD (1999). 
8 A tariff-rate quota is a combination of tariff and quotas. Imports are taxed at an in-quota tariff rate as long as the
volume is lower than a specified quota. An out-of-quota (and often higher) tariff is applied when the imports exceed
the quota.
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West African countries consider the issue of tariff escalation as crucial to the diversification of
their economies, and they, therefore, expect to see some improvements in that respect.
Konandreas and Greenfield (1996) have observed a reduced tariff escalation in the early years of
the post-Uruguay Round period and anticipated that this change could offer new opportunities
for diversification to developing countries. However, in a recent statement on market access,
6 a
group of developing countries — including four from Sub-Sahara Africa — noted that despite
slight reductions in tariff escalation observed in the post-Uruguay period, most of the escalation,
unfortunately, persists and has perverse effects. Tariffs are disproportionately escalated once the
exporting countries add values to primary commodities. Lindland (1997) particularly stressed
that on the average, developed countries still charge a 17% tariff difference between processed
products and primary commodities from developing countries. This situation is believed to shift
value-adding processing activities away from developing countries (Salinger, Amvouna, and
Savarese 1998). The Cairns Group, based on UNCTAD’s research results,
7 provides a relevant
illustration of this case. The statement indicates that developing countries share 90% in the world
markets for cocoa beans, 44% for cocoa liquor, 38% for cocoa butter, 29% for cocoa powder,
and 4% for chocolate.
3.2.  Tariffication and Tariff-rate Quotas
The process of tariffication, as defined above, consists of converting agricultural quotas into
tariffs or custom duties. The tariffication process is designed to ensure that the new tariffs
provide an equivalent (often much higher) level of protection to importing countries. Importers
must, however, grant a new access opportunity to exporters in the form of tariff-rate quotas.
8 The
access should not only maintain the pre-agreement trade volumes, but also increase the volume
by an amount of at least 3% (to be increased to 5%) of the domestic consumption of the in-quota
product (Table 3). The application of tariff-quotas measures consists of charging lower
nonprohibitive duties on specified quantities and higher duties for quantities that exceed the
quota. 
The system of tariff-rate quotas, designed to ensure continued access to traditional exporters
following tariffication, is a source of particular complexity (Hertel and Martin 2000). As early as
1998, Normile et al.,warned that the tariffication of nontariff barriers allow too much flexibility,
which leads to tariffs levels that provided higher protection than had previously existed. The
post-Uruguay Round period was particularly marked by such drastic increases in out-of quota9 Op. cit. see footnote 10.
10 Details are available on the WTO web page, www.wto.org
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tariff rates, a practice strongly criticized and condemned by West African countries (Tables 4
and 5). These excessive tariff rates, known as tariff peaks, are still a matter of concern in most
developing countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa.
In their statement submitted to WTO,
9 the coalition of developing countries confirmed the
importance these countries attach to the reduction of tariff peaks. The statement points out that
the post-Uruguay Round profile of many developed countries is characterized by high tariff rates
on temperate products and lower rates on tropical products. The report further states that tariff
rates in agriculture are most common in three product groups, namely major food staples, fruits
and vegetables, and processed food. Earlier investigations by FAO (1999) and OECD (1999)
confirm these statements. The FAO study gives the example of 1997, when there were 701 tariff
peaks in the European Community (EC), 514 in Japan and 195 in the U.S., corresponding to
26%, 27%, and 11%, respectively, of the tariff lines in each of these countries. The OECD study
finds that in 8 out of 10 OECD countries, the border protection to agriculture was higher in 1996
than in 1993, the EC being considered as one country.
Another tariff-related area posing enormous problems to LDCs refers to special safeguards,
which we discuss under general contingency measures in the next section.  
3.3.  Contingency Measures
Contingency measures include antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. They are a
set of measures that a country may temporarily use if its protection levels are higher than bound
tariffs (see Table 6 for bound tariff rates for West African countries). 
Provisions on antidumping allow countries to adopt protection measures against exporters that
sell at unfairly low prices, if proof of actual or potential material injury to the importing country
is established. While this might seem normal, there is an overwhelming tendency to abuse
antidumping measures for protectionist reasons (Heynen 2001). The danger for potential misuse
of these measures has always fueled contentions in international trade relationships. African
countries and Japan drew attention to the issue at the third WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999,
as indicated in Tables 4 and 5. 
Countervailing duties are used in situations when subsidized products in an exporting country
cause (or threaten to cause) "material injury" to a domestic industry producing a like product.
Application of safeguard measures is restricted to situations where the investigated imports cause
"serious injury" to a domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.
10 To use
antidumping and countervailing duties, a country must confirm the existence of an injury (or of
the threat of injury), following several investigation rules and procedures. The procedural
requirements are much simpler in the case of safeguards, which are other forms of duties. 11 These numbers are based on 8-digit level of classification except for Japan where the data was based upon 9-digit
classification.
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Table 6.  Bound Tariff Levels for Agricultural Products in West Africa and Chad
Country Average Bound Tariff Rates Applied Tariff
Rates
Countries with High Bound Tariff  Levels
Benin 119 10
Burkina Faso 150













Countries with Low Bound Tariff Levels
Guinea 40
Adapted from FAO 2000
According to a FAO study, the EU applied 26 price-based and 47 quantity-based special
safeguard measures between 1995 and 1998. The corresponding figures in U.S. are 24 and 6,
respectively, and in Japan the same figures were 4 and 73, respectively.
11 EU, Japan, and U.S.
accounted for more than 70% of price-based and almost all quantity-based special safeguards in
the world over the same period (FAO 2000). The study also estimates that over 6,000 tariffs may
potentially come into use as safeguard measures in the world. Besides the three major partners
mentioned earlier, the use of special safeguards is likely to be concentrated in Europe,
particularly in Switzerland, Norway, Poland, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. In Africa,
countries that would potentially use special safeguard measures are South Africa, Botswana,
Swaziland, Morocco, Namibia, and Tunisia.
The right to use safeguard measures is reserved to countries that have “tariffied” their quota
system. It follows that most countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are not eligible to use this instrument
while the bulk of their exports may be confronted with special safeguards in developed
countries. The use of special safeguards is, so far, concentrated on products such as meat,
cereals, fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, vegetable oil, and dairy products. The FAO study cited
above has pointed out that while special safeguards and other contingency measures may have
offered new trade opportunities (because they are used in conjunction with tariff-rate quotas),18
their implementation is usually not transparent. In general, exports from developing countries
may enjoy limited exemptions from safeguard measures, provided imported quantities are below
a specified level of total imports in the product of interest.12 De minimis is the maximum level of support that can be provided based on the total value of the product(s)
supported. Blue box supports must not exceed 5% of the value of a product in developed countries (10% in
developing countries). The least developed countries are exempted of these measures. 
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4.  DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Domestic support provisions are divided into those that are subject to reduction commitments
(amber box) and those that are exempt from such reductions. Exempt support measures may be
grouped into “green box” and “blue box” policies that are considered to have minimal distortions
on agriculture. Green box policies refer to government services such as research, disease control,
infrastructure development, food security, direct income support, assistance to restructure
agricultural production, and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance
programs. Blue box supports include policies involving expenditures below the de minimis
12
amount (5% for developed countries, 10% for developing countries, and unrestricted for the least
developed countries—see Table 7). They also include direct payments to farmers under eligible
production-limiting programs, as well as government assistance to agricultural and rural
development in developing countries. 
Table 7. Overview of Commitments on Domestic Support from the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture 










Amber box*, green box**
and blue box policies***
Reduce 20% over six years
De minimis provision
exempts commodity if less
5% of total value of
production
Same as DCs









Adapted from Regmi, Trueblood, and Shapouri 2000
* The “amber box” contains all domestic support measures that are subject to reduction commitments under the
Agreement on Agriculture. They are considered to have direct impacts on production and trade and must, therefore,
be cut back. 
** The “blue box” contains policies that are considered to have a minimum effect on trade. These policies include
some direct payments to farmer (e.g., for acreage reduction) as well as policies included in the amber box, provided
the support level is less than the de minimis, that is, 5% and 10% of the total value of the product for the developed
and developing countries, respectively. 
*** The “green box” regroups policies that are considered to have no or little impacts on trade, and are
consequently not subject to reduction commitment. They primarily include government services, such as research,
regulation and infrastructure. 13 Countries are required to report (notify) the level of their domestic support to the Secretariat of WTO.
14 Multifunctionality is often used in reference to the different roles agriculture plays in a given country’s economy.
These roles include, but are not limited to, ensuring food security, protecting the environment, managing structural
adjustment programs, supporting rural development, and alleviating poverty.
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As regards domestic support policies subject to reduction commitments (amber box), developed
countries are required to reduce the level of their aggregate support by 20% by the year 2000 and
developing countries 13.3% by the year 2004. The least developed countries are not to exceed
the annual aggregate support level established in the base period 1986-1988. Aggregate support,
as defined in the agreement, is the annual level of support expressed in monetary terms, thus
referred to as Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). This includes both product specific
and non-product specific support (Yap 1996).
It is extremely difficult to evaluate how these commitments have been implemented over the past
six years, as several countries have not notified
13 their aggregate support levels beyond 1997 or
1998. There is, however, some evidence of a repackaging of domestic support practices away
from the restrictive amber box measures towards the less or not restrictive blue and green box
policies (WTO 2001). This is commonly known as the “reinstrumention” (WTO 2001) of
domestic support programs, a practice that will clearly limit the scope of the reforms anticipated
in the support programs.  
African countries generally have null or even negative AMS because most of these countries
undertook liberalization reforms (under the structural adjustment programs) before concluding
the Uruguay Round Agreements. FAO (2000) explains that most countries in Sub-Sahara Africa
did not notify their domestic support measures for several reasons, including: (i) domestic
support measures are lower than allowed; (ii) there are no supports subject to reductions; and
(iii) there is a lack of capacity to evaluate and notify different types of support. The last reason
falls under the issue of technical assistance, which will be discussed below.
As in the case of tariff barriers (Tables 4 and 5), African countries agree that agricultural
subsidies in developed countries should be abolished, as they believe this would shift to the
South the production in industries that are no longer efficient in the North. In general, all
parties—particularly Africa, the U.S., and the Cairns Group—are in favor of reducing domestic
supports. Thus, the U.S. proposes that these policies be simplified into exempt supports (which
are minimally trade-distorting) and nonexempt supports (which are subject to reduction
commitments). However, the EU, and Japan, while desiring more reforms in domestic support
policies, stress the need to maintain the current three categories in order to properly address the
Multifunctionality
14 and other nontrade concerns in agriculture. For example, support to rural
rice producers in Japan responds to a traditional and cultural need, which forms the cornerstone
of social stability in the country. African countries also agree that it is necessary to use domestic
supports to tackle internal policy issues, but only to respond to their critical development needs
and to reduce poverty. An official Senegalese document (MPSG 1999) forcefully argues that
domestic support may have little or no distorting effects on the world market. One could
question the relevance of such a position for a country such as Senegal, which does not have the
necessary means to match the support levels of developed countries. 21
The level of domestic support in OECD countries in the post-Uruguay Round period is still high
and was estimated to 280 billion dollars in 1998 (MPSG 1999). In general, the transmission of
domestic supports to the world market may result in distorted prices and unfair competition
between countries. However, it is believed that domestic support measures implemented in
developed countries have reduced the world price for some basic commodities, especially food
products. Since most West African countries have a negative trade balance in products such as
rice, sugar, and wheat, it is reasonable to view any support to these products as income transfer
from governments in support-giving countries to West African consumers. Equally, one could
argue that the artificially low world prices resulting from domestic support measures has
encouraged imports, and thus created a disincentive that weakened the region’s capacity to
domestically supply these key products. The most relevant question today is to know to what
extent reductions in domestic support measures, as committed under the WTO, would affect the
agricultural production and food consumption in West Africa.
West Africa could face new challenges of food insecurity that would inevitably arise from a
possible relaxation of domestic support policies in developed countries. Given the current
economic situation in the region, there appears to be little room to ensure food security through
growth in agricultural productivity and a more effective market coordination, unless states
intervene and support producers in relation to input, training, research, infrastructure, and
assistance to commercialization. The limited progress made in agriculture over the past years
suggests that there is a need to increase productivity-enhancing investments in the sector while
developing institutional mechanisms to improve the performance of the marketing system. These
interventions may conflict with budget priorities followed under the structural adjustment
programs (SAPs), but they are necessary and thus require more attention. 
The Sahelian countries would also need to develop their untapped irrigation potentials in order to
achieve a more sustainable growth in food production through enhanced productivity and
reduced yield variability. The Conseil Inter-état de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel
(CILSS) is currently developing a priority water management program for a sustainable
agriculture in the region.  Preliminary budget estimates indicate that the program will cost about
2 billion U.S. dollars. 22
5.  EXPORT COMPETITION
The Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the introduction of new agricultural export subsidies
while requiring countries to reduce both the volume of, and the budgetary outlays corresponding
to, the existing subsidies. Developed countries are expected to reduce the governmental export
subsidy budget by 36% and the volume of subsidized exports by 21% over six years from the
base level of the period 1986-1990. Developing countries committed a 24% reduction in the
value and 14% in the quantity of subsidized exports over 10 years starting from the same base
(Table 8). They are also allowed to subsidize transportation and marketing costs on exports
during the first six years of the implementation period. With regards to the least developed
countries, they are exempted from any reduction commitment but are not allowed to increase the
level of their export subsidy. The issues of export credits and guarantees (or insurance) are open
for further negotiations (Table 8).
Similar to the case of domestic support, the use of export subsidies in the least developed
countries, if any, was limited and reduced to actions aimed at supporting marketing and transport
costs on exported products. Instead of subsidy, the feature of most Sub-Sahara African
economies was to tax exports as many, including Schiff and Valdés (1992), have noted. This was
done directly through export taxes and levies, or indirectly through exchange rate overvaluation.
Currently, the utilization of these policy instruments in West Africa is considerably reduced
following the implementation of successive adjustment programs and devaluations. 
Most West African countries continue to face serious difficulties balancing their budget and
cannot afford to provide subsidies to their exporters in the foreseeable future. They have no
means to match the level of support in developed countries, where subsidies are used both to
support farmers’ incomes and gain strategic shares on the world market. West African countries
are seriously concerned and expect that corrective measures will be taken regarding the latitude
given to developed countries to use export subsidies so long as these are within the range of their
commitments. 













Reduce value by 36% and
quantity by 21% over six
years from base (1986-90)
To be negotiated further
Disallowed
Reduce value by 24% and




Exempt, but no increases
Same as DCs
Adapted from Regmi, Trueblood, and Shapouri 200023
Apart from European Union countries, all trade partners considered in this report strongly
support the elimination of export subsidies (Tables 4 and 5). There is a lot of speculation
regarding the effects the elimination of export subsidies would have on world prices. While some
contend that this would result in an increase in world prices, and ultimately in an increased food
insecurity in Africa (Sarris 2000), others believe that the elimination would materialize in terms
of reduced custom duties that will leave price levels unchanged. The elimination of export
subsidies could also potentially lead to increased demand for foreign exchanges for the food bill,
as well as a decrease in budgetary receipts. It is also believed, as was the case with domestic
support, that a reduction in export subsidies would stimulate agricultural production in the least
developed countries through increased productivity. The debate remains widely open and
empirical works will be needed to clarify and document the West African position on export
subsidy issues. 
Closely related to export subsidy concerns are the issues of export credits and insurances, State
Trading Enterprises (STEs), export restrictions, and food aid. African countries and the Cairns
Group strongly support the elimination of export credits as well as an increased discipline on
other export financings. They argue that these different support measures create unfair
competition between their countries and other countries that heavily utilize these mechanisms to
increase their exports. The U.S. calls for more discipline on STEs and specifically proposes that
export credit issues be negotiated first between the OECD countries. The EU and Japan are also
in favor of reforming the STEs and want to see reductions in export credits and more
transparency and predictability in export restrictions. The need not to abuse food aid is also
stressed by the EU and African countries. This is a criticism specifically directed to U.S., which
is accused of using food aid as disguised form of export subsidy. However, in practice, most
African states have an ambiguous position on food aid, as ultimately they could limit it if they
wanted to. 
Export support policies tend to be easier to track than internal supports, so they have received a
lot of attention over the past six years and this attention is likely to continue in the future. Africa
will have to elaborate more on the role of STEs in reducing poverty and other basic development
goals in their countries. The continent must also stress, as Nigeria suggests, the need to
understand and regulate the role of multinational firms in the global food system.  15 Relevant international standard bodies would be the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarus Commission (food safety),
the International Animal Health Organization (animal health) and the FAO’s Secretariat of International Plant
Protection Convention (plant health).
16 The rules of origin are the criteria used to determine where a product is made. The feeling among the least-
developed countries is that these rules are not transparent. The rules of origin are necessary to implement a wide
range of trade policies such as quotas, antidumping, countervailing duties, preferential tariffs, and so on.
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6.  TECHNICAL REGULATIONS
Technical regulations, mainly the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), constitute the
most serious nontariff barriers faced by exports from Sub-Sahara Africa. In general, regulations,
standards, testing, and certification procedures vary widely among countries, and this creates
serious difficulties for producers and exporters. The aim of the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) is mainly to ensure that trade regulations do not constitute a disguised form of
protection. The Agreement allows countries to adopt their own standards but also encourages
them to use appropriate international standards when possible.
15 Technical regulations have a
direct implication for trade facilitation, that is, the simplification and harmonization of
international trade procedures. Trade procedures are defined, according to WTO texts, as
“activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and 
processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade.” Facilitating the
sampling, testing, and certification procedures on agricultural exports will be relevant in this
respect for African countries. 
However, most propositions to facilitate the movement of goods and services between countries
have so far collided along North-South interest lines (Tables 4 and 5). Custom regulation issues
seem to constitute the most important concern developed countries face as they trade with the
developing and least developed countries. For the Northern countries, customs procedures in the
South are lagging compared to the rapid intensification of world trade. For example, Messerlin
and Zarrouk (2000) report that world imports costs are 7-10% higher than what they should be
without bureaucratic red tape in customs procedures. Also, importers and exporters in the North
face significant administrative inefficiencies in developing countries, particularly in the
interregional transport sector. Developing and the least developed countries observe that the
most advanced economies adopt increasingly demanding technical regulations, irrespective of
the special development needs and the level or the technological development in poor countries.
Often cited regulations cover the rules of origin,
16 the regulations on labor, environment, and
SPS. Poor countries also perceive these regulations to be complex, demanding and inconsistent
across situations, and that, in practice, they become disguised forms of protection. Developing
countries, therefore, suggest that a clear distinction be made between mandatory rules based on
scientific standards, and optional guidelines based on individual countries’ laws. 
The temptation to abuse technical regulations has become particularly high, as the tariffication
process is increasingly dismantling the traditional nontariff protection instruments, such as
quotas. African countries and Japan have also pointed out that the WTO agreements on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) lack transparency and predictability and these shortcomings17 Article 10:1 of the Agreements of SPS and Article 12 of the Agreement on TBTs.
18 The conformity assessment procedures are part of the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, particularly in
its Articles 5 to 9. The aim of these procedures is to assess whether a traded good complies with technical standards.
These procedures must not discriminate between domestic and foreign firms.
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need to be addressed (Tables 4 and 5). They propose that attention be given to international
standards that are accessible to all. 
The SPS agreements are of particular interest to developing countries in general, and particularly
to West African countries. These agreements mainly regulate the acceptable level of residual
pesticides in products and the production processes, as well as the inspection rules of products.
As mentioned earlier, African countries support the idea that SPS and TBTs rules should be
accessible to poor countries, as these agreements anticipate that developed countries will set
their standards while considering special needs of developing countries, particularly their needs
in terms of trade and development.
17 Unfortunately, many least developed countries noted that
developed countries have imposed arbitrarily high standards, regardless of the climatic,
geographic or fundamental technological problems faced by developing countries. 
The most common practical problems faced by the least developed countries in terms of
technical standards are highlighted in UNCTAD (2000). These include: (i) the lack of timely and
accurate information on new standards; (ii) the lack of scientific data for specific thresholds or
limit values; (iii) the inconsistent application of procedures; (iv) the uncertainty due to rapidly
changing environmental and sanitary requirements in overseas markets; (v) the variation in
standards and regulations from one market to another; and (vi) the costs and difficulties of
testing and verification procedures. 
Thus, the least developed countries view the SPS agreements as cumbersome in a number of
ways. For example, EU regulations on aflatoxins have affected the Senegalese groundnut sector
(Box 2 in the Annex). Also, West African countries face tremendous difficulties meeting
technical requirements of the U.S. markets (Table 9). It appears, from Table 9, that from
February 2000 to January 2001 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued 175
detention orders on exports from West African countries. Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria are
the three countries most affected by these measures. These numbers may seem small if compared
to the total annual detentions in the U.S. during the same period, but they illustrate the difficulty
West African countries encounter in their attempt to export commodities to markets in developed
countries. They also justify the need to increase technical assistance and capacity building in
trade related areas in the region. Most of the detention reasons indicated in Table 9 are simple
technical requirements that could have been avoided, were the exporters adequately trained or
informed. 
The least developed countries have also denounced the imprecision in some of the legal texts on
technical regulations. This vagueness allows for loose interpretation of the regulations, and thus
offers many opportunities for abuse. In this respect, many West African countries voice clearly
that the conformity assessment procedures
18 must be simplified because they constitute 19 Article 2, Annex B of the Agreements on SPS suggests that a “reasonable” period be observed between the
introduction and the enforcement of new rules. However, this term “reasonable” has different interpretations in
developed countries, where variable time frames are applied (MPSG 1999). Doha 2001 further specifies the
meaning of “reasonable,” which now stands for “at least six months.”
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Table 9. Number of Detentions Issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on
Imports from West Africa: February 2000-January 2001
Country Number of
Detentions 
Common Products Common Reasons for Detentions




Côte d’Ivoire 57 Cocoa beans, Annatto seeds Filthy, salmonella, unsanitary
Gambia 10 Frozen fish Filthy
Ghana 62 Medicines, canned foods (cocoa



















unnecessary financial burden on their fragile economies. They express their need for an effective
technical and financial assistance in order to meet requirements of WTO standards. In MPSG
(1999), Senegal makes basic recommendations on ways to reduce standard-related distortions in
world trade. Minimal conditions include: (i) a more rapid and regular notification and discussion
of standards set by developed countries;
19 (ii) increased participation of African countries to
standards setting within international organizations; (iii) technical cooperation in order to
improve the evaluation procedure of conformity assessment; and (iv) mutual recognition of
national grades and standards authorities. In addition to these four recommendations, it would
also be useful to create a centralized database on all SPS standards that would contribute
substantially to fill the information gap in the field.27
Finally, it seems essential that the least-developed countries take note of the demand-driven
rapid changes in technical requirements in developed countries. There is, indeed, increasing
demand for more demanding, technical, social food safety, and environmental standards from
consumers in developed countries. These are inevitable dynamics that will decide the future of
technical standards in the global trade. With the increasing importance of multinational firms in
the world trade, any expansion and diversification of West Africa’s export market will require
that issues related to standards be tackled seriously. A realistic negotiation strategy cannot ignore
these ongoing changes, but must also ensure that the new privately developed standards do not
violate WTO agreements. This is certainly a very tough task in a world increasingly pushed into
competition, but West African countries must find a way to bring their smallholder-dominated
production to meet the challenges of more and more demanding standards.20 Supply-side constraints refers to the different institutional limitations that preclude a poor country from taking
advantage of a market access opportunity.  For example, Mali exported fish to Europe via Senegal in 2001.
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7. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTS 
The need of Special and Differential Treatments (SDTs) for the least developed countries arises
from the asymmetry in the level of development between WTO members. For West African
countries, it is important to maintain the asymmetrical nature of SDTs, a necessary condition for
a smooth and adequate transition into the global economy. It is a general feeling among African
countries that the SDTs for the least developed countries contained in many WTO Agreements
have not been implemented.
All members recognize the numerous difficulties faced by African countries in complying with
global agricultural trade reforms, and this is acknowledged under the SDTs regulations. They
support the idea of providing some kinds of technical assistance to the least developed countries
to help them increase their understanding of the WTO agreements, improve their capacity to use
the global trading system, and enhance their chance for economic and social development. They
also agree to give flexibility to African countries to use support measures to address
development and welfare needs. 
African countries, themselves, expect that the assistance should help them strengthen their
competitiveness, but it is not clear how this would be done. The African proposal emphasizes the
need to make technical assistance binding under the WTO agreements, however, this is not likely
to occur, considering the silence of other countries on the issue. Specifically, African countries
propose that the assistance should be directed towards building local expertise in global trade,
strengthening trade infrastructure, and addressing the so-called supply-side constraints.
20 The
assistance must also help them to overcome transitional costs and achieve development goals. 
Over the past few years, a number of international institutions have contributed to trade capacity
building in Sub-Sahara Africa—for example through training, dissemination of information and
regional seminars—but the needs remain enormous. The WTO annual budget allocated to
technical assistance is less than 0.6 million U.S. dollars. The bulk of the technical assistance
money, about 8.8 million U.S. dollars in 1999, comes from voluntary contributions from WTO
members. These contributions might not be accessible to all countries. The scarce technical
assistance money is likely to be most useful if it is spent to assist LDCs in drafting legal texts
that comply with WTO requirements, and to support locally technical expertise in SPS and other
technical regulations.
The maintenance of asymmetric and preferential agreements between the ACP and the EU may
also be viewed as a form of SDT. The decision by Doha 2001 to uphold the provisional ACP-EU
agreements up to 2007 is perceived by many West African countries as a positive outcome.
Whether or not these trade preferences promote West African trade remains, however, an
ambiguous question. 29
The concept of SDTs is becoming increasingly confusing, as countries such as Japan are
proposing Multi functionality-related issues as beneficiary candidates of the special and
differential treatments. In addition, Regmi, Trueblood, and Shapouri (2000) report that the SDTs
extended to African countries face an increasing opposition from middle-income developing
countries such as Argentina and Brazil. These countries support unconditional freer trade in
agriculture and, thus, consider SDTs to reduce the economic benefits of trade reform. 
West African countries have consistently shown a consensus regarding the provision of technical
assistance and SDTs. They also present many common views regarding other elements in the
WTO agreements, as shown in Tables 4 and 5 and discussed throughout the report. It appears
that there may be some economies of scale in gathering and processing information aimed at
improving the region’s importunity in the global agricultural trade. The active participation of
the region in the formulation of global trade policy necessitates qualified human resources. There
are about 260 West African representatives in international organization in Brussels, Geneva,
and New York (Table 10). 
Table 10. Number of WTO Delegates from West Africa and Chad Resident in Geneva,
Brussels, and New York in the First Half of 1999
Countries Geneva EU Brussels UN New York Total
 UN  WTO
Benin 0 0 10 10 20
Burkina Faso  0 0 6 6 12
Chad 0 0 1 3 4
Côte d’Ivoire 2 8 11 9 30
Gambia 0 0 5 8 14
Ghana 3 9 7 10 29
Guinea 2 3 5 10 20
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 5 4 9
Mali 0 0 4 5 9
Mauritania 1 1 4 4 10
Niger 0 0 4 2 6
Nigeria 6 10 8 26 50
Senegal 2 9 6 11 28
Sierra Leone 0 0 3 6 9
Togo 0 0 8 6 14
West Africa and Chad 16 40 87 120 263
Adapted from Blackhurst, Lyakurwa, and Oyejide 199930
8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main message from this review is that the world in the 21
st century is irreversibly engaged in
a multilateral trading system. However, six-year implementation of WTO agreements reveals
that important disagreements exist between member countries. Particularly, most of the least
developed countries, including those of West Africa, find themselves increasingly marginalized
by the global commercial tide. It is expected that WTO will continue the work towards meeting
one of its key objectives, in particular, ensuring that the least developed countries have a fair
share of the growth in global trade. 
While WTO’s reports consistently indicate an increase in the global trade volume in the post-
Uruguay Round era, efforts to liberalize the world agricultural trade are still limited by policies
such as tariff peaks and tariff escalations, domestic supports and export subsidies, as well as
nontariff barriers. There is a little quantitative evidence on the impacts of these various measures
on the agricultural production and trade in West Africa. This gap needs to be filled in subsequent
studies.
In general, West African and other least-developed countries have little or no control over
domestic agricultural policies in developed countries. Poor countries may, in principle, use the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in order to seek fairer treatments, if they are denied access
to markets in developed countries. However, they will need important (often nonavailable)
financial and human resources to prepare and follow-up litigations. Also, access to foreign
agricultural markets may be made difficult through disguised means, as discussed earlier in the
report. 
The compliance with WTO Agreements in developed countries may be limited or delayed by
persistent lobbying of powerful farmers’ organizations. These organizations in Europe and
Northern America have their own agendas, which include the maintenance or even the increase
in current support levels. West African countries must take note of this fact and use not only the
WTO forum, but also other diplomatic conduits that will increase market access opportunities for
the region. In particular, some developed countries have also made provisional market
concessions to the least developed countries. Examples of such concessions include the U.S.
AGOA legislation or the European “Everything but Arms” agreements. These are potentially
positive initiatives for the West African region, and there is a need to investigate their
effectiveness in improving the market access and competitiveness of countries in the region. 
The liberalization of world agricultural markets is not a short-term task. West African countries
are wise not to count on any sizeable increase of their share in the global agricultural trade in the
near future. This discouraging reality should, however, not prevent the region from intensifying
its targeted trade liberalization efforts, especially in relation to intra-regional trade. The region
may also make proper use of the WTO special and differential provisions regarding, for
example, domestic supports. Countries in the region may invest in agricultural research, market
information systems, infrastructure, and productivity-enhancing technologies. Market access is
certainly meaningless if countries lack the necessary capacity to produce goods or services
demanded by the markets. Investments in technologies and in capacity building are, therefore,
central to the short-term survival and the long-term competitiveness of the region.31
The effective provision of special and differential treatments and trade-related technical
assistance to the least-developed countries is a puzzling question. If sufficiently provided,
technical assistance may improve the competitiveness of poor countries which will compete in
the same markets with richer countries. The international community must honestly answer this
following question: To what extent are richer countries willing to see competitive poor countries
emerge? Civil societies in both rich and poor countries can influence the actions of governments
around the world for a more equitable and mutually beneficial multilateral trading system. The
West African economy will continue to be substantially dependent on international trade, and it
is hoped that the region will take appropriate actions in order to translate trade opportunities into
better living conditions for the poor. 21 More information on the tariff system within WAEMU is available on www.izf.net.
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ANNEX
Box 1. Fiscal and Commercial Policies in the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU)
The fiscal and commercial policies in WAEMU countries were characterized by a complicated
tax structure aimed at protecting the industrial sector while providing a substantial income to
governments. There were also important disparities between countries. In the early 1980s the
sources of government revenue were heavily weighed toward indirect taxes, especially taxes on
international trade. The tax system was heavily dependent on specific excise, export and import
taxes and was characterized by both regular and ad hoc large tax exemptions to sectors whose
imports and domestic turnover accounted for significant share of industrial and commercial
activity (IMF 1999a). In conjunction with SAPs in late 1980s, a comprehensive tax reform
aiming at improving tax administration was attempted in most WAEMU countries. Key
measures included the strengthening of the customs administration and control as well as the
reduction of ad hoc exemptions. The reform also targeted the simplification of the tax system as
well as the broadening of the tax base. The current fiscal regime concerns mainly the common
external tariff (CET) and the value-added tax (VAT).
Common External Tariff
Fiscal policy reforms took a regional dimension in late 1997, when WAEMU decided to proceed
with the initiative for a union-wide CET with the objective to put in place by January 1, 2000, a
tariff structure consisting of four rates: 0%, 5%, 10%, and 20%. The initial phase of the CET
began July 1, 1998, when all imports duties were subject to an overall ceiling of 30% and tariffs
on intra-community trade were reduced by 60%. A second phase, implemented six months later
(January 1, 1999), limited the number of tariff rates to four:  0%, 5%, 10%, and a temporary
maximum rate of 25%. In addition, provisions are made for a statistical tax that would not
exceed 1% (IMF 1999a). The four tariff rates applicable since January 2000 correspond to
product categories 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Category 0 is composed of a limited number
essential social goods; Priority goods, basic primary commodities, equipment goods and specific
inputs form Category 1; Category 2 groups inputs and intermediary goods; and Category 3
covers final consumption goods as well as other goods not mentioned in the three other
categories.
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In addition to the CET, which corresponds to the custom duty (DD), imports are subject to the
solidarity tax (PCS), the statistical tax (RS) and, when applicable, the variable tax on imports
(TCI) and the decreasing tax of protection (TDP). The TCI is applicable to agricultural, agro-
industrial, livestock and fishery products with the exception of fish and fish-based products. The
aim is to compensate “important” protection losses that result from the erratic price variation on33
the world market. The meaning of “important” was left unexplained. The TDP applies to
industrial and agro-industrial products with the aim to compensate important protection losses
associated with the implementation of the CET. Products proposed to benefit from the TDP are:
concentrated milk, vegetable oil, sugar, concentrated tomato, cigarettes, detergent powder, meat
products, batteries, bags in jute and polypropylene. Concerning the PCS and RS, they are each
applied at the rate 1% of  the c.i.f value of imports. Reforms in relation to the CET also include
from January 1, 2000, a full tariff dismantling on intra-WAEMU trade in agricultural goods and
approved industrial products of local origin. Authorities will endeavor to limit the application of
the TDP and TCI (IMF 1999b). 
Value-Added Tax
In 1998, the WAEMU Council of Ministers adopted, in the form of regional directives, a
program to harmonize the VAT and excise regulations. The VAT regulations aim at (a)
implementing a single rate (ranging from 15% to 20%), (b) broadening the VAT base (e.g., by
extending it to all services, agricultural inputs, and petroleum products), (c) reducing the number
of exemptions and improving the exemption control, and (d) improving the refund procedures.
Regulations regarding excise taxes are aimed at (a) limiting the number of goods subject to these
taxes, (b) implementing ad valorem rates, (c) harmonizing excise rates, and (d) unifying the
excise rate for domestically produced and imported goods. Each member country is expected to
introduce these measures into its legislation by January 2000 (IMF 1999c). There is a need to
evaluate how these measures have been implemented since their entry into force. 22 Regulation CE No. 1525/98 adopted on July 16, 1998 and effective since January 1, 1999. Original norms were
set between 1-50 ppm depending on the primary commodity and its final use. The new regulation limits the
maximal content to 4 ppm for total aflatoxin (i.e., B1 + B2 + B3 + B4) and to 2 ppm for aflatoxin B1 alone if the
nuts are to be directly consumed or used as ingredient in a food product. The maximal contents in aflatoxins for
groundnuts intended for other uses are 15 ppm and 8 ppm for the total aflatoxin and aflatoxin B1, respectively.
23 Directive No. 98/53 CE that requires, for each 15 tons of product, a global sample of 30 Kg is to be collected in
100 small samples of 300g each which are further mixed into 3 sub-samples of 10 Kg upon which all the analysis
are performed.
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Box 2. Challenges to the Groundnut Sector in Senegal (Adapted from MPSG 1999)
Groundnuts have traditionally played a central role in the Senegalese economy by providing a
living to people both in rural and urban areas, supporting the production of local industry and
procuring foreign exchange to the country. The implementation of the new agricultural policy
since 1985 progressively resulted in a quantitative and qualitative depletion of seed capital, as
well as a drastic reduction in the use of fertilizers.
On the main export markets, notably the U.S.A. and EU, there is a decreasing trend in the
consumption of groundnut oil while the use of other vegetable oils like sunflower, and rapeseeds
appears to be increasing. Oilseed production on these markets receives important domestic
support, in the form of direct payments of the “blue box” policies. These measures increase the
competitiveness of domestic oilseed production in these countries, and thereby negatively affect
export from traditional exporters.
Senegal directs about 90% of its groundnut exports towards the EU market. In July 1998, a
stricter regulation
22 concerning the maximum aflatoxin contents in exported groundnut was
enacted and supported by a new and reinforced directive on sampling procedures.
23 These new
norms are based on scientific evidence that cannot be easily challenged within WTO, as Senegal
itself faces serious health issues that may be linked to aflatoxin. However, the sampling and
analysis procedures may be reassessed and Senegalese authorities may negotiate more flexibility
in applying the new requirements to their exports, arguing the specific climatic conditions in the
Sahel. The compliance with stringent technical norms increases unit cost of products and reduces
their competitiveness on the world market.35
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